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ENTREPRENEURSHIP, WINDFALL GAINS AND FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS: EVIDENCE 
FROM GERMANY 
Abstract 
We investigate the link between the propensity to become an entrepreneur 
and the exogenous release from financial constraints in Germany. This is defined in 
terms of the movement from employment to self-employment on receipt of a 
financial windfall. A theoretical framework developing Evans and Jovanovic (1989) 
is set up and tested with panel data from German households. The results show that 
financial constraints do exist given that individuals are more likely to start a 
personal business after receiving a windfall gain. The value of windfall gains has a 
significant but non linear effect on the decision to become self employed. The data 
reveal that differences in ability and income affect the change in employment status. 
We also report that there is no evidence that becoming self employed involves 
the anticipation of windfall gains. 
Keywords: Entrepreneurship, windfall gains, financial constraints. 
JEL: G20, M13. 
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1 Introduction 
The question of whether funding gaps inhibit entrepreneurship has generated intense 
debate within both economic theory and public policy for more than two decades. In their 
seminal article, Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) show that information asymmetry leads to inefficient 
credit rationing. In contrast, de Meza and Webb (1987) argue that information asymmetry 
results in overfinancing for entrepreneurs. An empirical evaluation of these conflicting views 
is now even more important given that governments have identified entrepreneurship as an 
important source of employment and growth (Audretsch, 1995).1 
There is a considerable amount of research on the effect of financial constraints on 
entrepreneurship in the US and the UK using household panel data. However, com-
parable analyses of European countries such as Germany are still scarce. This paper 
investigates the extent to which, in Germany, the likelihood of starting a business is affected 
by financial constraints. Following the approach employed in previous US studies (e.g. 
Blanchflower and Oswald (1998)) we use household survey data to obtain self-
employment information. Our data come from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP). 
Germany has experienced a steady decline in the number of start-ups in recent years for 
example, around 800,000 new firms were set up in 2008 which was roughly one half of the 
total number of the record year 2001.2 The number of full-time start-ups fell from nearly 
670,000 in 2003 to about 330,000 in 2008. In 2001, part-time entrepreneurs started over 
900,000 new businesses but in 2008 it was less than 470,000. Around two thirds of all start-
ups use their own funds with only one third coming from external sources. The 
overwhelming importance of own funds suggests that entrepreneurs face potential financial 
constraints, Thus, exogenous positive shocks to personal wealth may be an important 
driver of start-up activity in Germany. 
The German government has introduced a number of polices designed to ease fi-
nancial constraints and encourage business start-ups. At both federal and state levels 
1The European Commission considers entrepreneurship as a 
crucial element for achieving its political, social and economic objectives, see http: 
//www.europa.eu.int/comm/enterprise/entrepreneurship/. 2Citation: http://www.kfw.de/DE 
Home/Research/Steckbriefe.jsp. 
 
4 
the government has launched a large number of equity and debt programs aimed at 
arresting this decline. These programs include guarantees, interest rate subsidies and 
direct investment by state-owned financial institutions. The state-owned German Bank 
for Reconstruction (KfW) launches, on a regular basis, programs that promote the financing 
of start-ups. For example, small start-ups can benefit from a program called Start-up 
Money. The program started in 1998 and offers loans of up to 50,000 Euros. Larger and 
more capital-intensive start-ups can apply for subordinated loans from the start-up fund of 
the European Recovery Program or from the KfW loan program for entrepreneurs. In 2004 
the German government created the “ERP-EIF Dachfonds”3, a pool of funds that provides 
€500 million specifically for equity-investments in high-tech start-ups. It is planned to 
double the value of this fund in the near future. The German government has also 
established a credit mediator who negotiates with banks on behalf of the entrepreneur. 
Start-ups from universities or research institutions are eligible to be supported through 
scholarships under the EXIST program and founders of particularly technically 
challenging start-up projects can receive grants.4 
These numerous attempts by the German administration to improve the access of 
entrepreuneurs to external finance raises the question about the severity of liquidity 
constraints in Germany. We study this question by evaluating the impact of windfall 
gains on the probability of moving from employment to self-employment. 
Measuring the release from financial constraints is not straightforward, because of the 
two-way links between access to external financing and personal wealth. To overcome 
this difficulty, we hypothesize that an exogenous increase in wealth has the effect of 
increasing the probability of entering entrepreneurship given that financial constraints 
exist. A positive relationship between the propensity to enter entrepreneurship and the 
proxy for the exogenous wealth increase would therefore suggests that financial 
constraints limit entrepreneurship. This hypothesis is tested by employing windfall 
gains as a proxy for an exogenous increase in wealth. 
3ERP and EIF are the abbreviations for European 
Recovery Program and European Investment Fund respectively. 
4See http://www.existenzgruender.de/englisch/self employment/launch/support programmes/index.php 
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The paper contributes to the existing literature in a number of ways. First, to the best of 
our knowledge, this is the first study to analyse the impact of financial constraints and their 
effect on the movement from employment to self-employment in Germany. Second, we 
consider categories of individuals that exhibit similar characteristics in terms of income 
and ability. Third, if individuals anticipate a windfall gain, the gain will not be exogenous. 
We therefore evaluate the exogeneity of the windfall gain by analyzing the effects of different 
lags and leads of windfall gains on the self-employment decision. 
Our main findings can be summarized as follows. We find that windfall gains signifi-
cantly increase the probability of becoming self-employed. The data reveal considerable 
variation in the effect of windfall gains across the income and ability subsamples. High 
income groups are more likely to become self-employed. In addition, high-ability groups are 
more likely to set up their own businesses after receiving a windfall. Finally, the results 
suggest that windfall gains are not anticipated and can therefore be considered as an 
exogenous shock to personal wealth. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 briefly describes the literature on financial 
constraints. In Section 3 we develop the theoretical model and set out the econometric 
methodology; Section 4 gives a description of the data and reports the results; and finally, 
Section 5 presents the conclusions and proposes areas for further research. 
2 Literature on testing financial constraints 
Empirical research into the financial constraints faced by entrepreneurs has to address two 
major challenges. The first is that financial constraints cannot be measured directly.5 It is 
therefore necessary to use a proxy measure and an increase in net worth provides a 
means of testing the presence of liquidity constraints, Evans and Jovanovic (1989) and 
Taylor (2001). The liquidity constraint hypothesis argues that a lack of capital, or 
5Some studies (e.g. van Praag, de Wit and Bosma (2005)) 
use direct reports from entrepreneurs about the financial constraints they encountered. However, reported 
constraints are also an imperfect measure of frictions in the financing markets because they do not reveal 
whether the rejection is the result of ability estimations by the bank or to asymmetric information. 
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collateral, will prevent new business start-ups. 
The second challenge is that wealth, as the most commonly used proxy for the release 
from financial constraints, may be endogenously determined.6 Xu (1998) shows that 
individuals considering potential self-employment accumulate personal wealth prior to their 
decision to switch into self-employment. This would mean that the reported relationship 
between wealth and self-employment is endogenously, rather than exogenously, 
determined. 
The endogeneity issue has been addressed in a number of papers, for example, Blanch-
flower and Oswald (1998), Taylor (2001) and Disney and Gathergood (2009). These pa-
pers use an exogenous increase in wealth as a proxy for the easing of financial constraints 
in relation to the self-employment decision. A number of different measures of wealth 
increase have been used including unanticipated windfall gains (Taylor, 2001); inheritance 
(Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian and Rosen, 1994; Blanchflower and Oswald, 1998; Hurst and 
Lusardi, 2004)) and increased housing wealth (Disney and Gathergood, 2009). All report 
a significant relationship between the release from liquidity constraints and the entry into 
self-employment. 
In addition, there is evidence from Sweden, Lindh and Ohlsson (1996), that lottery 
winnings increase the probability of becoming self-employed. More generally, Johansson 
(2000) uses an income measure of wealth and finds that liquidity constraints are present 
in Finland. Paulson and Townsend (2004) also find evidence that financial constraints 
affect entrepreneurial activity in Thailand. 
An alternative form of exogenous wealth increase relates to housing assets. Black, de 
Meza and Jeffreys (1996) for the UK, and Hurst and Lusardi (2004) for the US find 
evidence of a positive relationship between increases in housing wealth and business start-
ups. However, Hurst and Lusardi (2004) show that the relationship becomes insignificant 
when a fifth-order polynomial is specified and that only for the top 5% of the wealthiest 
people did the increase in financial resources via housing market gains have a significant 
6The banking literature suggests that personal wealth is 
the most natural candidate for capturing the relaxation of financial constraints given that it can serve 
either as equity or as collateral (Bester, 1985; Besanko and Thakor, 1987). 
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impact on entrepreneurship. 
In contrast to the UK and US housing markets, the peculiarities of the German housing 
market mean that the impact of housing wealth on the decision to become self employed is 
likely to be minimal. Owner occupation is still relatively rare. In addition, house prices in 
Germany have fallen since the mid 1990s. Therefore this form of easing of financial 
constraints is unlikely to have had a significant impact as an exogenous increase in wealth. 
We therefore analyse the impact of a broader definition of windfall gain on the decision 
to move from employment to self-employment. 
Additionally, we assess the impact of the exogenous windfall on groups of individuals 
sharing the same, or similar, characteristics. Such groupings would act as a proxy for 
individuals whose a priori propensity to enter entrepreneurship is likely to be similar and 
therefore variations in the entry decision will only be caused by different financial constraints. 
Finally, windfall gains such as bequests may be anticipated, something which questions 
their exogeneity as an easing of financial constraints. This proposition is analysed by the 
testing of lead and lag windfall gains on the decision to become self employed. 
3 Theoretical background and empirical implemen- 
tation 
3.1 Model setup 
The analytical framework used to identify the basic drivers of the occupational choice 
follows Evans and Jovanovic (1989). We extend their model in two respects. First, Evans 
and Jovanovic (1989) model borrowing capacity as a percentage of personal wealth. 
We, however, account for the fact that total investment is often a sunk cost when the 
business is started and it is only the entrepreneur’s ability to make the business a success 
that determines whether or not the loan will be paid back. Second, we consider 
entrepreneurial abilities to be beneficial for all occupations. Ability not only helps to 
achieve success in self-employment but also increases the wage level. 
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Consider the representative agent who decides at the start of the period between her 
own business activity or working for someone else. At the end of the period the individual 
gets profit from self-employment activity equal to π or wage W. We denote the self-
employment decision of employed individuals at time t as Switchit. Labour is considered as 
non-divisible, so that the individual can either work as an entrepreneur or as an 
employee. Non-divisibility makes W the opportunity cost of entrepreneurship and 
implies 
{ 
1 ; π — W ~ 0 
Switch i t = 0 ; π—W<0. 
Self-employment generates gross returns of 
y = θIγξ (1) 
where θ is a measure of “ability”, I is the amount of business investment, γ < 1 reflects the 
productivity of the investment, and ξ is a log-normal disturbance whose logarithm has 
varianceσ2 ξ and E(ξ) = 1. We assume decreasing marginal returns on investment. Individuals 
are considered as risk-neutral. At the time the investment decision is made, the realization 
of ξ is unknown, and potential entrepreneurs decide based on expected values. The 
individual owns equity E ¯ to start her business but needs additional funds L from 
financial institutions. One unit of borrowing costs the gross interest rate R. The 
opportunity cost per unit of equity is r. In the absence of financial frictions the individual 
would invest 
I* = L * + E  ( 2 )  where L* is such 
that the marginal return of investment equals the gross interest rate R. For simplicity we 
assume that r = R. The borrowing capacity is modeled by ˆL(θ). We 
assume that financial institutions rate individuals by collecting information about their 
personal entrepreneurial abilities. This rating implies an increased borrowing capacity if 
the (observable) personal abilities go up and vice versa. The individual is financially 
constrained if ˆ L(θ) L*, that is, the optimal amount of borrowing exceeds borrowing capacity. 
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The phenomenon of borrowing capacity falling behind the desired borrowing level is 
a result of asymmetric information. If lenders lack private information about their 
clients’ ability to repay, they may limit their downside risk by binding the amount of 
credit on the would-be entrepreneur’s publicly observable individual characteristics. We 
derive the following expected net profit from starting a business given that financial 
constraints exist 
]γ - R(ˆL(e) + ¯E) - W(e). (3) 
πn = e [ˆI(e) 
Ability e also positively affects the success in employed work. That is, we assume W(e 
= 0) =w¯ > 0 and W'(e) > 0. The derivative of net profits with respect to a marginal 
increase in personal wealth E ¯ yields 
]γ−1 -  R> 0. 
=  e γ  [ ˆ I ( e ) ( 4 )  
The marginal return from an additional unit of equity exceeds the costs if the individual 
is financially constrained. Thus, more equity, and the subsequent increased level of 
investment, results in higher profits. In cases where the increase is high enough to make 
gross profits exceed the threshold W, individuals switch into self-employment. Thus our 
model predicts that for all individuals sufficiently close to the marginal individual 
∂Switch i t 
Therefore, the impact of the 
exogenous wealth increase is our main variable of concern in the empirical framework. 
The derivative of net profit with respect to entrepreneurial abilities gives 
 
8πn ]γ + ( 8W 8e . (5) 
Note that the expression in brackets in (5) is positive as long as the entrepreneur is 
financially constrained, that is, Iˆ < I*. However, the sign of the derivative depends on the 
magnitude of the impact of ability on W. Unlike Evans and Jovanovic (1989), we allow for 
multiple switching points in which π - W = 0. Note that additional personal 
8πn 
8E 
>0.∂ E
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wealth may cause switching from wage-employment to self-employment at both moderate 
and high levels of ability if the function πn(θ,.) is concave for lower but convex for higher ability 
levels. Empirically, we use sub-samples to test how the impact of an exogenous increase 
in wealth and the move into self-employment is affected by entrepreneurial ability and 
income from employment. 
3.2 Econometric specifications 
As Blanchflower and Oswald (1998) and Holtz-Eakin et al. (1994), we proxy the exogenous 
wealth increase by windfall gains. However, our measure is broader and includes not only 
inheritance, but also additional extraordinary payments, such as bequests and lottery wins 
as defined in the GSOEP. Given that our dependent variable is binary, we employ logistic 
regression. The general estimated specification is the probability that a person enters self-
employment 
Pi t  = E(Switch i t = 1|V i t) =1+e_Vi t  
1 
Where Pit is the probability that a person becomes self-employed, Switchit = 1, given a 
vector of explanatory variables Vit. Given our theoretical model, we estimate the following 
specification of the reduced form of the transition from full time employment to self-
employment selection by the equation 
Switchit = Λ(δ windf a l lsit_1 + νZit + X t + εit) (6) 
where i represents individuals, t is time, Switchit is a dummy variable equal to one if the 
person decides to be self-employed in the next period and zero otherwise, windf allsit_1 is 
a dummy variable equal to one if the person received windfall gains in the previous period 
and zero otherwise, Zit is a vector of the person-specific variables, Xt is a set of time 
dummies, and Λ is the cumulative density function of the logistic distribution. 
The vector Zit includes factors that reflect ability and several other characteristics of the 
individual which we use as controls.7 The dummy variable gender is equal to one, 
7These controls are similar to those included by others in 
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the literature (see, e.g. Evans and Jo- 
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if the person is female and zero otherwise. The individual’s education is represented by 
education and is measured by the number of years of education. The variable married 
provides information about the marital status, it is equal to one if the individual is 
married and lives together with the partner, and is zero otherwise. This variable proxies a 
typical family background. The variable hhsize measures the number of persons living in 
the particular household. Finally we employ four dummy variables which reflect the 
person’s age: 20-30, 31-40, 41-50, and 50+. 
Given that the model is testing the impact of windfall gains on the change from 
employment to self-employment, we include a measure of income opportunity cost for 
those that were employed because switching would result in the loss of this income for them. 
We therefore estimate the following regression for employed individuals only 
Income t = α0 + α1educ t + α2exper t + α3married t + α4gender t (7) 
+AGE tΓ + u + ε t 
where Income t is labour earnings, Age t is the set of age dummy variables, exper t is the 
length of time with a particular firm in years, while married t, gender t, education t is defined 
as before. Finally, u and ε t are the individual fixed effects and the error term, respectively. 
The predicted values from this regression are rescaled to construct the foregone wages 
measure, Wage t. For rescaling we employ monotonic transformation, Wage t = 
Log(Income t 
d + Constant) which is needed to avoid negative expected values 
of predicted income. 
Besides opportunities, there might be other factors which play a role in decision to switch 
to self–employment. We generate a measure for individual abilities we estimate specification 
(7) using whole sample (both employed and self–employed individuals). In this case, 
Following Griliches (1977), we interpret u as an individual’s ability (Ability ) which is also 
included in the vector Z t in specification (6). 
vanovic (1989), Evans and Leighton (1989)). We experimented 
with other controls, including education dummies, country of origin, employment of parents, squared 
measures of foregone earnings and abilities. None of the additional controls affected our main results. 
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3.3 Subsamples 
The empirical literature investigating the degrees of financial constraints faced by en-
trepreneurs has identified that individual-specific characteristics play an important role 
(e.g. Paulson and Townsend (2004)). Given the predictions of our theoretical model, we 
hypothesise that individuals that belong to different income and ability groups will have 
different likelihoods of becoming entrepreneurs. Consequently, we split the sample into 
subsamples based on personal income, as estimated in (7), and on ability. The splits are 
based on individuals’ average values of the characteristics by quartile. For instance, a 
person with average labour earnings above the 75%th percentile of the distribution will 
be classed as high income, while a person with average labour earnings below the 25%th 
percentile will be classed as low income. The same process applies to ability. 
4 Empirical Evidence 
4.1 Data 
To investigate the effects of windfall gains on the likelihood of starting a business, we use the 
German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP). It is a wide-ranging representative longitudinal 
study of private households and provides information on all household members and 
consists of Germans living in the Old and the New German States, foreigners, and recent 
immigrants to Germany. The Panel started in 1984. On average there are about 47,000 
personal characteristics per year. Incomplete answers and sample screening produced a 
sample of 61,380 individual characteristics for the years 2000-2006. We apply a number 
of selection criteria to the data. First, given that we are investigating the movement from 
employment to self-employment, we drop all unemployed people from our analysis. 
Second, to eliminate individuals that are still in school or are close to retirement, 
individuals older than 65 and younger than 20 are also excluded. 
As Taylor (2001), we use data collected annually about labour market activity in the 
periods between interviews. An individual is defined as self-employed if the person answers 
the question ”What is your current occupational status?” with ”Self-employed” 
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in the current period, but responded with other answers indicating employment in the 
previous period. Windfall gains are defined in the GSOEP as inheritance, donations, 
lottery winnings and payments due to assets such as life insurance. 
Insert Table 1 
Descriptive statistics for the annual means of all variables employed in the analysis are 
described in Table 1. We see that about one percent of German individuals started their 
own businesses, and six percent of individuals received windfall gains. 
4.2 Econometric Results 
In this section we report our results dealing with the link between the likelihood of being 
self-employed and windfall gains. Table 2 presents results from regressions of the self-
employment dummy variable on windfall gains and our control variables for imputed ability 
and wages, gender, household size, age dummies, marriage and education. We report 
marginal effects, estimated around mean points.8 Column 1 shows the results for the 
windfall dummy. Column 2 reports the result for the value of windfall gains. Column 
3 includes a squared term for the windfall value and tests the hypothesis that above a 
certain value, the windfall is so large that there is no need to continue working. Column 
4 reports the results for the interaction between income and ability. Finally, column 5 shows 
the results when we exclude all individuals whose parents are self employed. This is done 
because it is possible that business owners are more likely to leave a bequest, in the form 
of an existing business, than are non-business owners. In the case of parents who are 
business owners the inheritance may not result in the movement from employment to 
self-employment and therefore to the creation of a new business. The receipt of an 
inheritance could therefore be a proxy for the fact that the individual simply had a 
parent that was a business owner (Sch¨afer and Talavera, 2009).9 As a result, a finding that 
inheritance is an important influence on the decision to start a business could 
8Estimations of marginal effects 
around median points give similar results. 9See also Panunzi, Ellul and 
Pagano (2009). 
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be interpreted as suggesting that being the offspring of an entrepreneur increases the 
probability of starting a business. 
Insert Table 2 
Column 1 indicates that the likelihood of becoming an entrepreneur increases when 
a person receives a windfall gain. The coefficient on windfall is positive and statisti-
cally significant at 1%. In Germany, receipt of a windfall gain increases the probability of 
starting an own business by 0.50%. The result supports the hypothesis that additional 
wealth matters when moving from employment to self-employment and therefore suggests 
binding financial constraints. 
The coefficient of the expected wage variable is insignificant. This finding indicates that 
the opportunity cost effect of earnings from regular employment is not important in 
Germany. Unlike Lindh and Ohlsson (1996), we find no evidence that women are less likely 
than men to become self-employed when receiving a windfall gain. Age decreases the 
likelihood of becoming self employed in Germany with the strongest results being found in 
the over 50 age group. The number of years of education is positive and highly significant as 
is household size. The positive effect of hosehold size in Table 2 may reflect the advantage 
of a family business in which more “helping hands” are available. If performance is likely 
to be better when there are more contributing household members, starting a business will 
be more likely the larger the household size. Marital status does not affect the probability 
of becoming self–employed. 
Column 2 shows that the value of windfalls is an important influence on the decision 
to enter self-employment with higher valued windfalls more likely to lead to a movement 
into self-employment. The column 3 result shows that the relationship is non-linear with 
higher value windfalls making it less likely for the recipient to move from employment 
to self-employment. An interesting result is reported in Column 4. The windfall dummy 
remains positive and significant but the ability variable becomes negative. However, the 
interaction term is positive and significant suggesting that non-linearities are present in the 
relationship between ability, wages and becoming self-employed. This is explored 
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further in Tables 3 and 4. Column 5 shows that the probability of starting a business is 
positively related to windfall gains for those that are not related to business owners. 
Insert Table 3 
Table 3 reports the results for ability quartiles with column 1 showing the lowest ability 
and column 4 capturing the highest ability quartile. We find that windfall gains do not 
affect the probability of becoming self employed in the lowest ability group. However, as 
hypothesised, the coefficient is significant and positive in the highest ability quartile. The 
marginal effect on becoming self–employed given a windfall gain is 0.60% for the highest 
ability group. The significant result for the second ability quartile suggests a non–linear 
relationship. High-ability women tend to shy away from starting an own business more than 
high-ability men (Table 3). The reverse is true for low- and lower-medium ability types of 
women. These results may indicate that in, German society, earning an adequate return on 
their personal ability is easier for high-ability women in employed occupations than in self-
employment. 
Table 3 also reports a surprising result for the opportunity costs of self-employment. 
Low- and lower-medium ability types are more likely to start their own business if their 
predicted opportunity costs, the wage variable, increase. The explanation may be that 
the gap between the actual wage of business starters and the predicted value is such 
that frictions in the labour market may make it impossible to close the gap. In this 
case, self-employment may offer the only possibility to get a return that better reflects 
the earning potential expressed by the predicted opportunity costs. Thus, the likelihood 
of becoming an entrepreneur increases if the earning potential increases. The positive 
effect of education reported in Table 3 shows that education fosters entrepreneurship in 
the higher ability quartiles but not in the lower ability quartiles. 
Insert Table 4 
Table 4 shows the effect of income on the self-employment decision with column 1 
reporting the results for the lowest income quartile and column 4 the highest income 
quartile. The results are significant and positive for the top income quartile only. 
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The highest marginal effect occurs in the highest quartile, 0.80%. Thus, within the low 
income groups, the potential benefits are insufficient to make this group move to self-
employment after receiving a windfall gain. In contrast, despite the higher opportunity cost, 
the high income groups are capable of achieving even higher incomes from self-employment 
and therefore the exogenous increase in wealth moves them over the threshold. These 
findings are consistent with results obtained by Hurst and Lusardi (2004) who report that 
the probability of becoming a business owner in the United States is a non-linear 
function of wealth and that only at the top of the wealth distribution is there a positive and 
significant relationship between an exogenous wealth increase and entrepreneurship. 
The analysis is further developed by looking at the interaction of ability and income. 
In results not reported here, we find that high income and high ability individuals are 
more likely to move into self-employment on receipt of a windfall gain. The interaction term 
results in a marginal effect of 1.2%, higher than for the sample as a whole. The interaction 
term for low income and ability groups is insignificant, suggesting a non linear 
relationship.10 
The preceding analysis is based on the underlying assumption that windfalls occur 
randomly and that individuals do not predict the receipt of particularly inheritances. 
However, if individuals did predict the receipt of a windfall gain, the assumption that 
windfalls occur randomly would not hold. Hurst and Lusardi (2004) find that both past 
and future inheritances predict current business entry. This suggests that inheritances 
capture more than simple liquidity. 
Insert Table 5 
Table 5 provides an additional attempt at differentiating between the results reported 
here and those of Hurst and Lusardi (2004). Instead of instrumenting personal wealth 
by inheritance, we employ lag and lead windfall dummy variables. Columns 1 and 2 report 
different lag periods, t-1 and t-2, and columns 3 and 4 contemporaneous and 
10The estimation results are available upon request. 
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lead periods, t and t+1. The significance of the windfall variable changes depending on 
whether it is a lag or a lead. The results for lags are significant and positive whereas those 
for leads are insignificant. The results therefore suggest that those moving from employment 
to self-employment do not anticipate windfall gains. 
5 Conclusions 
This paper has analysed the impact of a windfall gain on the probability of moving from 
employment to self-employment in Germany. It therefore assesses the importance of the 
financial constraints faced by would-be entrepreneurs. We find that windfall gains have a 
positive impact on the decision to move from employment to self-employment. However, the 
results differ between different income and ability sub-samples. The analysis shows that the 
income matters for the top income quartile group. The income results therefore suggest that 
financial constraints are present for the highest income group but not for lower income 
groups. Thus the opportunity cost at low incomes is not binding whereas for high income 
groups the additional anticipated returns are sufficient to move into self-employment when 
financial constraints are eased. We also find a non linear relationship between ability and the 
movement from employment to self-employment after the easing of financial constraints. 
We find no evidence that those moving into self-employment anticipate receiving a 
windfall gain in the short run. Overall, the results suggest that there are binding financial 
constraints to entrepreneurship in Germany. 
The results have important implications for policy in Germany. Faced with decreases 
in the number of new business start-ups, the German government has introduced a 
number of financial programmes designed to encourage the move into self-employment. 
However, it may be that the types of businesses being supported, and the types of 
financial help being offered, have to be reassessed. In addition, the limitations placed on 
the assistance may also have to be re-evaluated. 
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Data Appendix 
German Socio-Economic Panel (GS OEP) 
The GSOEP - windfall gains are derived from positive answers to the following questions: 
 Did you or another member of the household receive a large sum of money or other 
forms of wealth (car, house, etc.) as inheritance, gift, or lottery winnings last year? We 
refer to money or other forms of wealth worth more than 2,500 EURO. 
 Did you receive any sort of compensation or severance package from the company? 
 Did you or another member of the household own any of the following savings or 
investment securities? 
– Savings account; 
– Savings contract for building a home; 
– Life insurance; 
– Fixed interest securities; 
– Other securities; 
– Company assets. 
How high was the income received from interest, dividends and profits from these 
savings and securities in the last calendar year? 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable ,u Median σ N observations
New Self-employed 0.01 0.00 0.09 61,380 
Windfall dummy 0.06 0.00 0.25 61,092 
Windfall, 100K EUR 0.02 0.00 0.30 61,000 
Female 0.52 1.00 0.50 61,380 
Education 12.36 11.50 2.69 61,380 
Married 0.72 1.00 0.45 61,380 
Age 30+ 0.30 0.00 0.46 61,380 
Age 40+ 0.34 0.00 0.47 61,380 
Age 50+ 0.26 0.00 0.44 61,380 
Household Size 3.02 3.00 1.23 61,380 
Wage= Log(Imputed Income) 9.97 10.23 1.00 61,380 
Imputed Ability 0.01 -0.01 0.20 61,380 
 
Note: N is sample size, while a- and /1 represent standard deviation and mean respectively. 
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Table 2: Logit Estimates of Individual Self–Employment Decision 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Windfall 0.005***
  
0.005*** 0.004*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Windfall value  0.001* 0.002**   
  (0.000) (0.001)  
Windfall value2   0.000**   
   (0.000)   
Wage 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Ability 0.001 0.002 0 . 0 0 1 0.085* 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.049) (0.002) 
Ability × Wage    0.008*  
    (0.005)  
M a r r i e d  0 . 0 0 2 0 . 0 0 1 0 . 0 0 1 0 . 0 0 2 *  0.002 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
F e m a l e  0 . 0 0 1 0 . 0 0 1 0 . 0 0 1 0 . 0 0 2  0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
A g e  3 0  0 . 0 0 2 * * 0 . 0 0 2 * * 0 . 0 0 2 * * 0 . 0 0 2 *  0.002* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
A g e  4 0  0 . 0 0 2 * * 0 . 0 0 2 * * 0 .002* * 0 . 0 0 2 * *  0.002** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
A g e  5 0  0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003** 0.003*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Household Size 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Education 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N. observations 61,380 61,271 61,271 61,380 60,526 
Pseudo R2 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
χ2 119.903 106.964 110.457 122.737 116.243 
d.f. 10 10 11 11 10 
 
Note: The table reports marginal effects after logit estimation of the transition into self–employment. 
Columns 1-4 refer to the whole sample. Column 5 presents results for a subset of individuals that do not 
have self-employed parents. Regressions include constant and time dummy variables. Huber–White standard 
errors are reported in the brackets. Marginal effects are estimated around mean points. * significant at 10%; 
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 3: Logit Estimates of Individual Self–Employment Decision by ability quartiles 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Windfall 0.002 0.010** -0.000 0.006** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) 
Wage 0.027*** 0.008** 0.001 -0.001** 
 (0.009) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) 
Married -0.005* -0.003 -0.001 -0.000 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Female 0.022** 0.007* -0.002 -0.008*** 
 (0.009) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002) 
Age 30 -0.008*** -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Age 40 -0.011*** -0.001 -0.003* 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Age 50 -0.008*** -0.003* -0.003** -0.000 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) 
Household Size 0.002*** 0.001 0.001 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Education -0.002 -0.001 0.001** 0.001*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
N. observations 14,414 14,372 15,654 16,930 
Pseudo R2 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.05 
χ2 56.500 31.255 25.146 82.294 
d.f. 14 14 14 14 
 
Note: The table reports marginal effects after logit estimation of the transition into self–employment. The 
columns refer to different ability quartiles. Column 1 is the lowest ability quartile and column 4 is the 
highest ability quartile. Regressions include constant, and time dummy variables. Huber–White standard 
errors are reported in the brackets. Marginal effects are estimated around mean points. * significant at 10%; 
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 4: Logit Estimates of Individual Self–Employment Decision by income quartiles 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Windfall 0.001 -0.000 0.005 0.008** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Wage -0.000 0.008*** -0.000 0.009 
 (0.000) (0.003) (0.002) (0.007) 
Ability -0.016*** -0.022*** -0.026*** 0.000 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) 
Married -0.001 -0.003* -0.003* 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Female -0.000 0.009** 0.000 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.005) 
Age 30 -0.004*** -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) 
Age 40 -0.003*** -0.003** 0.000 -0.004 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) 
Age 50 -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.002 -0.005 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) 
Household Size 0.001*** 0.001 0.001 0.002** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Education 0.000** -0.001*** -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
N. observations 12,263 15,835 16,414 15,423 
Pseudo R2 0.09 0.05 0.03 0.02 
χ2 101.780 66.101 38.638 40.970 
d.f. 15 15 15 15 
 
Note: The table reports marginal effects after logit estimation of the transition into self–employment. The 
columns refer to different income quartiles. Column 1 is the lowest income quartile and column 4 is the 
highest ability quartiles. Regressions include constant, and time dummy variables. Huber–White standard 
errors are reported in the brackets. Marginal effects are estimated around mean points. * significant at 10%; 
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 5: Logit Estimates of Individual Self–Employment Decision, Different windfall 
lags 
 
 
windf alli,t_2 w i n d f  al l i , t_1 w i n d f  a l l i , t w i n d f  a l l i , t + 1  
Windfall 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.002* 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Ability 0.001 -0.002 -0.003 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Wage 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Married -0.002 -0.002* -0.002* -0.002** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Female -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Age 30 -0.002** -0.000 -0.000 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Age 40 -0.002** -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Age 50 -0.003*** -0.002** -0.002** -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Household Size 0.001** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Education 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
R 2 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
x2 127.012 169.880 98.933 83.272 
d.f. 15 16 15 14 
 
Note: The table reports marginal effects after logit estimation of the transition into self–employment. 
Sample size is 61,380 observations. Regressions include constant, and time dummy variables. Huber– 
White standard errors are reported in the brackets. Marginal effects are estimated around mean points. * 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
